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National Conference 
The Public Sector and Social Justice 
Don Dunstan 
Nineteenth-century Socialists were overwhelmingly concerned with title 
to property, because at that time the economic power wielded by 
capitalists was closely linked to ownership. This led Marx and his 
followers to the belief that if private ownership were abolished and all 
property held by the community in common, the evils of capitalist 
exploitation and the State as we know it would both disappear after a 
transitional period. 
No democratic socialist party now subscribes to that view. The transfer 
of a sector of the economy to public ownership does not produce the 
happy results so lyrically forecast by Marx and Engels. Likewise, the 
nineteenth- century capitalists forecast a bright future for the world 
in an economy ruled by a policy of untrammelled laissez-faire. Despite 
the clear failure of that policy, and the disastrous results it has 
brought in cyclical depression and economic chaos, the injustice of 
increasingly inequal distribution of wealth, the laissez-faire model is 
the one to which the advocates of the New Right constantly urge us. 
It is worth stating again. It is not a rule from on high that the result 
of pursuing each persons own self-interest results in the maximising of 
self-interest for all. Enlightened self-interest wcJuld not produce such 
a result, and most economic self-interest is unenlightened. With the 
present organisation of joint stock companies the market place does not 
and will never approach the ideal state of free competition, and the 
controllers of capital are the first to endeavour to eliminate or 
restrict competition. 
Social democratic parties rightly reject both cloud-cuckoo land models. 
They, the socialists, are frankly and proudly interventionist. They say 
it is the duty of government in a modern state to ensure that each 
sector of the economy is so organised as to meet the needs of the people 
on a basis of social justice, of security and equality of opportunity. 
And to meet that goal, an efficient and extensive public sector has 
proved vital. 
There is a long history of successful public enterprise in Australia. I 
hope you will forgive me if I use illustrations from my own State, but 
as it was that State which elected the first Socialist Government with a 
majority in its own right, I think it is appropriate. The 
interventionist approach has four bases for operating undertakings in 
the public sector: 
a) there are-services which are necessary to the public, and 
where the criteria for successful operation cannot be those 
of purely profit- .lOtivated management, and where broader 
public policy must be paramount. (Obviously postal and other 
communication services and the broad range of public 
utilities fall into this category.) 
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there are services where adequate provision to the public 
will not occur unless the private sector is forced to meet 
public sector competition. 
there are services where provisions of assistance to the 
workers and the poor is vital as a measure of 
re-distribution and economic benefit. 
There are some areas of needed development which, though 
profitable, the private sector does not undertake, so the 
community must. 
In South Australia, until the mid 1940's electricity was supplied by the 
private sector. In Adelaide and some country areas this was by Adelaide 
Electric Supply Co., in other country districts by small companies and 
in a few cases by municipalities. Dissatisfaction with tariffs, and with 
breakdowns in supplies led to a Royal Commission appointed by the 
Playford Liberal Government which recommended nationalisation of. the 
Adelaide Electric Supply Co. This was opposed in Playford's own party by 
the forerunners of the present New Right - but passed Parliament with 
Labor Party support. The resulting Electricity Trust of South Australia 
has been an outstanding success. By using economies of scale and opening 
up and developing its own coal supplies from deposits at Leigh Creek it 
could guarantee both cheap tariffs and continuity of supply. 
Moreover, South Australia was in the proces's of becoming an 
industrialised State in place of an overwhelmingly rural one. In the 
depression years South Australia's unemployment rate had been 33%, and 
all parties were intent on building an industrial base. As a matter of 
public policy, it was possible to offer concession tariffs as part of an 
industrial development package. That would never have occurred with the 
old private interests trying to keep the dividends up to shareholders. 
As a public enterprise it was of major benefit to the private sector, 
and suggestions in South Australia that it be on a privatisation list 
are widely regarded as completely absurd. The Trust has now taken over 
the supply of electricity state-wide, and has looked into interstate 
grids. This is a simple and obvious example of the advantages of 
public sector operation. 
Until the 1970's, South Australia, unlike most other States, had no 
Government Insurance Office. Insurance was entirely operated by the 
private sector. The result was that form reliable companies rates were 
comparatively high. A number of companies offered cut rates and 
spectacularly failed, with dire and tragic results for policy n°lders. 
Life insurance premiums were unreasonably high because the life 
companies paid large commissions up front to canvassers for life 
insurance. Only 17% of premium income was invested in South Australia. 
The Labor Government determined to set up an Insurance Commission with 
the power to cover all insurable risks. This was bitterly fought by the 
existing industry - they got their employees to demonstrate in the 
streets - on the grounds that it was unfair competition and that it 
would go bankrupt anyway and cost the public a packet. 
2 
b) 
c) 
d) 
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I got the measure through Parliament. The only cost to Government there 
has been the advance of $10,000 for 3 months, interest free. Since 
that time the S.G.I.C. has been one of the major success stories in 
Australian Insurance. It brought premiums down generally. Particularly 
did it do so in life assurance. By refusing to get locked into 
complicated policies with lots of gimmicky extras, or to pay large 
commissions to canvassers, it sold simple term policies over the counter 
at much lower cost to the consumer than the private sector was charging. 
Backed by State Government guarantee the purchasers of policies knew 
they were safe and cashed in policies with the private sector and bought 
new ones at the lower rate from S.G.I.C. A very large investment fund 
was generated from the premium income which has been used by successive 
governments to support development in South Australia. Of course the 
private sector would like to see the competitive pressure on them by 
what is now a very large organisation removed. But the public rightly 
sees the S.G.I.C. as an investment of beneficial public policy. 
South Australia, more than any other State, has seen the necessity to 
keep workers' costs low by providing public housing. The first major 
housing scheme, financed by the State Bank, was set up under a Labor 
Government in 1924-6 in the "Thousand Homes Scheme". In the late 1930's 
the SA Housing Trust was created It provided a high proportion of 
workers homes. Under its charter, it was empowered to build whole 
industrial states, providing factories, houses, and infrastructure. It 
also provided concessional rents for poor families, and under the Labor 
Government became an instrument of Town planning in buying up inner city 
buildings and restoring them so that the process of urban renewal which 
in America has had the wealthy moving into central city housing, did 
not, as there, become "poor removal", pushing the poor people to fringes 
of cities at great social cost. In addition, the State Bank has 
provided housing loans not provided by the private sector, and means 
tested, so that the public sector built or financed housing amounts to 
about 30% of total house-building. This has been an essential feature 
of keeping costs to working people down in South Australia, a measure of 
essential social justice. Without this very large slice of publicly 
supported housing, costs for rent and homebuying in South Australia 
would'be much higher, and one only needs to compare the housing costs in 
States where the public sector housing is much smaller to see what would 
be the result. 
It can be seen from these examples that a real benefit derived from the 
very natures of public enterprise is that it is forced to demonstrate 
that it is oriented to public service and benefit, and that it is 
accountable. "» 
Private enterprise has a completely different agenda. It has long been 
demonstrated that in any sizeable private enterprise today, ownership 
and control are largely divorced.- Shareholders, for the most part, have 
no knowledge of, or indeed interest in, company policy. The connection 
between them and the board of directors is tenuous indeed - shareholders 
are there to get dividends on their investment and appreciation in its 
market value. The headline-making successes of the corporate barons of 
Australia do not derive from their spectacular contributions to 
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development of Australian manufacturing or tertiary industries, but from 
the legalised piracy of company takeovers. The Elliotts, Bonds and 
Hohmes-a-Courts of this world are not developers, but 
money-manipulators. Sir Ronald Brierly has been longer at it than most 
of them, and his early financial successes were based not on 
development, but on buying up companies whose share value was less than 
the value of their assets, and then asset-stripping, i.e. closing up the 
company and selling off the assets. It is a feature of the Australian 
private sector that in operating the corporate structures, directors 
must both in the short and the long term keep shareholders satisfied 
by a combination of dividends and bonus issues. Even when they do that 
they are liable to attack on their positions of power in the internecine 
takeover struggles which bedevil this country, and have had a serious 
effect upon our overseas debt situation through the private borrowings 
to finance them. 
An obvious case in point is the BHP. That company itself has used the 
takeover device to eliminate competition. Let me cite an instance.- In 
1970 a locally owned and operated cement manufacturer, had, by investing 
quite heavily in up-to-date equipment, been able to get production of 
cement at the lowest price in Australia. This was not only of great 
benefit to South Australia, with its large public housing and public 
works program. It was of great benefit to the private sector as well. 
The Company exported to other States, and its prices undercut its 
competitors. Because it had invested in equipment,, rather than pay high 
dividends, its share prices on the market were below the value of the 
company. The major competitors interestate had as majority 
shareholders, the BHP and CSR. Those two organisations then mounted a 
takeover bid on the South Australian company. Its Managing Director 
came to ask my help, which was given in two ways. I arranged through 
the State Bank a substantial line of credit to support him and his 
directors. I personally rang the Chairmen of BHP and CSR and pointed 
out that both companies were separately seeking rights of significance 
to their companies fromt the SA Government, and that if they continued 
their attack on the SA concern, the SA Government would be found to be 
uninterested in thier requests. They withdrew their takeover bid. If 
it had been successful, it was quite obvious that SA would have faced an 
increased cost of cement which would have cost us dearly. But this case 
is an object lesson on the dangers for corporate management in devoting 
money to re-equipment, research and development. Australian industry is 
notorious for the inadequacy of the resources it provdes for those 
purposes. And again, BHP is a prime example. The BHP as Australia's 
major shipbuilder, totally failed to provide for the modernising of its 
Whyalla yard, (which alone "had 40% of Australia's shipbuilding 
capacity), so that it was unable to meet stiff overseas competition. By 
the time of the closure of the Whyalla yard, it took seven cranes at 
Whyalla to do what one would do in a Korean shipyard. Again, as 
Australia's steel manufacturer BHP demanded a substantial grant from the 
Government to keep its works open. Given its published profitability, 
how is it that BHP has not financed re-equipment adequately from its own 
resources? Because to protect their backs from those after control of 
the concern, Mr Loton and his predecessors have been desperate to keep 
the investors happy. The suggestion that transferring an enterprise 
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from the public to the private sector is automatically a means of 
providing a new climate of efficiency and public responsibility is 
simply ludicrous. I have vivid memories of the derision heaped on me by 
Sir Norman Young, Chairman of the Bank of Adelaide, over appointments I 
made of non-established technocrats to the boards of the State and SA, 
Savings Banks. Those banks are today amalgamated and flourishing. The 
Bank of Adelaide, with a long tradition and substantial clientele, 
operating in the protected banking climate pre-Keating, failed under 
orthodox private sector management. 
As John Dawkins said in a paper recently: 
"The mere fact of public ownership is not a determinant of 
efficiency. One has to look only at the varying levels of 
performance between public enterprises to realise that this is 
the case. Or, to take an international example, .labour 
productivity in the US postal service has been found to be more 
than double that in the UK (5). Telecom's initiative in 
developing a new national optical fibre trunk network illustrates 
that existence of a protected public monopoly is still consistent 
with technological innovation." 
and a g a i n , 
"The debate on the performance of public enterprise tends to take 
for granted the efficiency of the private sector. This assumption 
should not go unchallenged. There is a large body of evidence 
that the private sector is no model of hard-edged efficiency, as 
its history of boom and bust readily implies. The disciplines of 
the market place have not prevented considerable disparities and 
fluctuations in the efficiency and performance of private 
companies. The mess that our privately-owned steel and motor 
vehicle industries got themselves into, with the aid of 
short-sighted government policies, is an obvious example. The 
traditional theory of the perfect market quickly wilted in the 
face of empirical study, the evidence of predatory behaviour, the 
fact of industry protection, the development of monopolies and 
cartels, and the reality of externalities. 
The self-correcting devices of shareholder accountability and 
threatened takeover also have an unconvincing history. As Bob 
Ansett recently complained, the current rash of takeover raids 
has concentrated management's attention on profit maximisation at 
the expense of a more productive expansion of market share. The 
extensive use of overseas borrowings by corporate raiders has 
increased our foreign debt. At the same time revenues may be 
diminished at least in the short-term because it is expected that 
the interest paid on these borrowed funds will be offset against 
existing profits, including those of the raider's subsidiaries 
and affiliates. 
Large parts of our independently-minded private sector also 
conduct their business under the public umbrella of tariff and 
quota protection, with the support of R & D and export grants, 
bounties, and various tax concessions, including, until recently, 
the subsidised lunch. 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
More significant is the fact that a competitive market simply 
doesn't exist for many commodities. If a public monopoly is 
privatised but market dominance persists, then as the OECD 
observed the new company "could turn out to be worse or no better 
than the public sector monopoly it replaces". As PP McGuinness, 
one of the principal Australian proponents of privatisation, has 
warned: 
"There is mounting evidence that (privatisation) is not in 
itself a very useful way of correcting the deficiencies of 
bureaucratic corporations...The difficult problem of 
providing the right kind of incentive structure for public 
sector managements and effective competitive restraints on 
the abuse of market positions of a natural monopoly by 
management and unions, have little obviously to do with 
ownership...The central issue is to get the government-owned 
authorities working effectively and responsively. Who owns 
them, whether a public service bureaucracy or a private 
sector bureaucracy, is not really important." 
In short, the form of ownership, whether private or public, is 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for improved 
performance. The actual determinants of productivity and 
efficiency are factors like managerial capacity, o r g a n i s a t i o n , 
technology, capitalisation, labour force 'morale and flexibility, 
market environment, regulatory structure and degree of 
competition, none of which is naturally or exclusively associated 
with a particular form of ownership." 
I have dwelt on this issue because, though I am aware that questions of 
capital injection and efficiency will be dealt with at length later in 
this seminar, there is an alarming and implicit assumption in issues 
raised in a number of the papers provided to the ALP Federal Caucus on 
each of the major Commonwealth-owned public enterprises - that transfer to 
a registered company in which the Commonwealth holds a majority 
shareholding would be a step to greater efficiency, first, by subjecting 
the directors to the personal liabilities possibly incurred under the 
Companies Law, and second, by forcing the company from public service 
conditions for its employees and from interference through regulatory 
requirements of a number of ministries other than the one responsible for 
the enterprise. 
The first reason is not spelt "out and argued - not suprisingly. It does 
not bear the most cursory examination. A threat of additional personal 
liability will hardly add to the keenness and efficiency of directors. Nor 
has a case been made out that present board members are unkeen or 
inefficient. Provision to take the enterprises outside public service 
rules and to remove unnecessary bureacratic regulation and interference 
can be made without transferring to a registered company structure. And if 
Ministers move with a will, it can be accomplished in a short time. 
But the suggestion has a sinister connotation. I heard a bitter lament 
from the New Zealand Labor Party last weekend. There a number of public 
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undertakings have been "corporatised". It is now plain, from moves which 
are creating uproar and discontent in this party that this was merely a 
facade for eventually disposing of more and more shares to private 
ownership. Unable to dispose of the undertakings wholesale, 
corporatisation with mixed shareholding is merely a device for doing it 
piecemeal. 
The case for a strong, efficient, significant public sector, in which the 
overriding concern is for public service and social justice rather than 
private power and wealth remains unchanged. 
I do not believe the people of Australia elected a Labor Party Government 
to carry out the policies of the Liberal Party. 
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